TIME: Almanac 1995

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<text id=93CT1600> <link 93HT0848> <link 90TT1560> <link 89TT1282> <title> Afghanistan--History </title> <history> Compact ALMANAC--CIA Factbook Southwest Asia Afghanistan </history> <article> <source>CIA World Factbook</source> <hdr> History </hdr> <body> Afghanistan, often called the crossroads of central Asia, has had a turbulent history. In 328 B.C., Alexander the Great entered the territory of present-day Afghanistan, then part of the Persian Empire, and crossed the Helmand River to capture Bactria (present-day Balkh). His invasion was followed in succeeding centuries by those of the Scythians, White Huns, and Turks. In A.D. 642, Afghanistan was invaded by the Arabs, who introduced Islam to the area. The Arabs quickly gave way to the Persians, who controlled the area until A.D. 998, when they were conquered by the Turkic Ghaznavids. Mahmud of Ghazni (A.D. 998-1030) consolidated the conquests of his predecessors and turned Ghazni into a great cultural center and base for frequent forays into India. Following Mahmud's short-lived dynasty, various princes attempted to rule sections of the country, until the arrival of the Mongols in 1219, who destroyed many cities, including Herat, Ghazni, and Balkh, and laid waste to fertile agricultural areas. Following Genghis Khan's death in 1227, a succession of petty chieftains and princes struggled for supremacy until the late 14th century, when his grandson Tamerlane incorporated Afghanistan into his vast Asian empire. Babar, who descended from Tamerlane and founded India's Moghul dynasty, made Kabul capital of an Afghan principality. He is buried there in a simple but attractive garden. Ahmad Shah Durrani founded modern Afghanistan in 1747. A Pukhtun, Durrani was elected king by a tribal council after the assassination of the Persian Nadir Shah at Khabushan in the same year. Durrani consolidated chieftainships, petty principalities, and fragmented provinces into one country. His rule extended from Meshed in the west, to Kashmir and Delhi in the east, the Amu Darya (Oxus) River in the north, and the Arabian Sea in the south. All of Afghanistan's rulers until the Marxist coup of 1978 were from Durrani's tribe, and, since 1818, all were members of that tribe's Mohammadzai clan. European Influence Collision between the expanding British and Russian Empires influenced Afghanistan significantly during the 19th century. British concern over Russian advances in central Asia and influence in Persia led to two Anglo-Afghan wars. The first occurred between 1839 and 1842 and is remembered today for the ferocity of Afghan resistance to foreign rule. The second (1878-80) also grew out of the "great game" of imperial conflict between Britain and Czarist Russia and was sparked by the Amir Shir Ali's refusal to accept a British mission in Kabul after previously receiving a Russian envoy. This conflict brought Amir Abdur Rahman to the Afghan throne. During his reign (1880-1901), the British and Russians together established the borders of what became the boundaries of modern Afghanistan, with the British effectively in control of Kabul's foreign affairs. Despite German efforts to play on anti-British feelings and have the Afghans foment trouble along the borders of British India, Afghanistan remained neutral during World War I. Afghanistan's policy was not, however, universally popular within the country. Habibullah, Abdur Rahman's successor, was assassinated by members of an anti-British movement in 1919. His son Amanullah regained control of Afghanistan's foreign policy after launching the third Afghan war. During this conflict, the war-weary British gave up their rights after some early Afghan victories. The Afghans celebrate this event on August 19 as Independence Day. It commemorates the signing of the treaty of Rawalpindi on August 8, 1919. Reform and Reaction King Amanullah, who assumed that title in 1923, moved to end his country's traditional isolation in the years following the third Afghan war. He established diplomatic relations with most countries and, following a 1927 tour of Europe and of Ataturk's Turkey, introduced several reforms, such as the abolition of the traditional Muslim veil for women and the opening of a number of coeducational schools. These measures quickly alienated many tribal and religious leaders which, with the deterioration of the army, made Amanullah easy prey for the Bacha-i-Saqao ("son of water-carrier"), a brigand who captured Kabul, thereby forcing Amanullah's abdication in January 1929. Prince Nadir Kahan, a cousin of Amanullah's, defeated the Bacha-i-Saqao on October 10, 1929. With considerable Pukhtun tribal support, he was declared King Nadir Shah. Four year later, however, he was assassinated by a fanatical follower of King Amanullah. Nadir Khan's 19-year-old son, Mohammad Zahir Shah, succeeded to the throne. King Zahir Sha reigned from 1933-73 when his cousin, Sardar Mohammad Daoud-prime minister from 1953-63-overthrew the monarchy in a near bloodless coup. During his 10 years as prime minister, Daoud solicited both military and economic assistance from Moscow and introduced controversial social policies, including the abolition of purdah. Daoud's efforts to establish a Pukhtun state in the Pakistan-Afghan border area created years of tension with Pakistan and led eventually to his dismissal in March 1963. King Zahir Shah promulgated a liberal constitution in 1964, providing for a two-chamber legislature to which the King would appoint one-third of the deputies, the people would elect another third, with the remainder selected indirectly by provincial assemblies. Zahir's "experiment in democracy" produced few lasting reforms, but it permitted the creation of unofficial extremist parties of both left and right. Daoud's Republic and the April 1978 Coup Amid charges against the royal family of corruption and malfeasance and worsened economic conditions caused by the severe 1971-72 drought, former Prime Minister Daoud seized power on July 17, 1973, after a relatively bloodless military coup, while the king was outside the country. Daoud abolished the monarchy, abrogated the 1964 constitution, and declared Afghanistan a republic with himself as its first president and prime minister. His attempts to carry out badly needed economic and social reforms met with little success and the new constitution promulgated in February 1977 failed to quell chronic political instability. In addition, during this period the two factions of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), the Khalq, or people's party, and the Parcham, or flag party, ended their 10-year schism. On April 27 and 28, 1978, the united party initiated a bloody coup that overthrew Daoud, assassinated him and most of the ruling Mohammadzai family, and established the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Nur Mohammad Taraki, secretary general of the PDPA, became president of the Revolutionary Council and prime minister. Opposition to the Marxist government developed almost immediately; and, after a major revolt in Nuristan in the summer of 1978, it subsequently grew into a countrywide insurgency. Most Afghans opposed the imposition of a Marxist-style "reform" program which ran counter to their deeply rooted traditions. Differences between the PDPA's two factions also surfaced early and resulted in the exile, purge, or imprisonment of Parchami followers. By September 1979, a dispute between the two top leaders, Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, who had replaced Taraki as prime minister in March 1979, resulted in Amin killing Taraki and assuming complete power. The Soviet Invasion The Soviet Union quickly moved to take advantage of the April 1978 coup. In December 1978, Moscow signed a new Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation with Afghanistan, and the Soviet military assistance program grew significantly. As the insurgency spread, and the native Afghan Army began to collapse, the regime's survival grew more dependent upon Soviet military equipment and advisers. This set the stage for the largest deployment of Soviet troops outside the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe since the end of World War II. On the night of December 24, 1979, large numbers of Soviet airborne forces began to land in Kabul. On December 27, they killed Hafizullah Amin and installed in his place Babrak Karmal, leader of the Parcham faction, who had flown into Kabul from the Soviet Union. Babrak was a member of the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan formed during the 1960s, and served in Parliament between 1965 and 1969. By the spring of 1980, Soviet troop strength in Afghanistan had grown to 85,000. In the years since the invasion, the Soviets and the regime they maintain in Kabul have been unable to establish authority outside the capital city or otherwise to make good the Soviet conquest. Both Herat and Qandahar are substantially out of regime control. An overwhelming majority of Afghans oppose the communist regime, either actively or passively. Afghan freedom fighters, or mujahidin, remain active throughout the country, and regular fighting occurs in almost all 29 provinces, while the Afghan Army continues to disintegrate. Babrak Karmal's slender power base shrank until his fall from power in May 1986 and replacement by Najibullah, former chief of the Afghan secret police, or KHAD. Soviet failure to win a significant number of Afghan collaborators, or to reconstruct a viable Afghan army, has prompted them to bear an increasing brunt of the fighting and a large share of the responsibility for civilian administration. Despite Soviet efforts, the 120,000 troops now in Afghanistan maintain only a tenuous military standoff with the mujahidin. Although the Soviets have failed to fashion an effective surrogate regime in Kabul, they are committed to this goal, as was underscored by Karmal's removal and replacement by Najibullah as PDPA General Secretary. Prior to Karmal's fall, indications of Soviet displeasure with the fortunes of his regime had mounted. These included relatively direct criticism of Karmal in the Soviet press and other, less subtle signs, such as failing in April 1986 to receive Karmal officially while devoting noticeable attention to the Moscow visit of Prime Minister Keshtmand, a Shi'a from the Hazara region. Najibullah established a reputation for grim, brutal efficiency during his tenure as KHAD chief. KHAD, by many accounts the regime's most effective institution, achieved a measure of success under Najibullah in sowing dissension among Pathan tribes along the Pakistan-Afghan border. Himself a Pathan, Najibullah will likely continue to make such activities a key part of his policy as he moves to consolidate the regime's authority. Najibullah's rise can largely be attributed to a Soviet desire to see party, government, and military policies more effectively implemented. Political Conditions The Afghan regime remains ineffective, with little future prospect of becoming a viable surrogate capable of standing on its own. The PDPA is riven by deepseated divisions, which frequently erupt into violence. The dominant Parcham faction holds most state power, although its Dari-speaking, multiethnic, urbanized adherents still comprise only 40% of the party. It controls KHAD, the state security service, an important source of leverage. Presidents Taraki and Amin controlled the Khalq faction, which Interior Minister Gulabzoi now directs. Gulabzoi is a longtime rival of General Secretary Najibullah. Khalqis are mostly Pashtu speakers from eastern areas, often from a lower class or rural background. They predominate in the armed forces. In the past, the Khalqis had a reputation for being more radical and nationalist than the Soviet-sponsored Parchamis. Regime efforts to broaden its base of support have not been successful. In 1981, it formed the National Fatherland Front, a popular front organization charged with bringing together various regime front organizations such as the Democratic Youth of Afghanistan, in a patriotic, nonparty context. In 1985, the regime stung by criticism of its human rights record by the UN Human Rights Commission, tried to erect a facade of legitimacy by convening a Loya Jirga, or grand assembly of tribal elders. Most of the participants turned out to be regime functionaries. The remainder, or "independent" delegates, were reportedly paid well for attending. Local council elections in 1985 also had, from the regime's point of view, little positive effect, as did attempts that year to broaden the base of the ruling Revolutionary Council and Council of Ministers. Several "independent" figures brought into the two bodies turned out to have close ties to the regime. Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, July 1986. </body> </article> </text>